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Many studies find that households increase their consumption after the receipt of expected income
payments, a result inconsistent with the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis.  Consumption can
increase adverse health events, such as traffic accidents, heart attacks and strokes.  In this paper, we
examine the short-term mortality consequences of income receipt.  We find that mortality increases
following the arrival of monthly Social Security payments, regular wage payments for military personnel,
the 2001 tax rebates, and Alaska Permanent Fund dividend payments.  The increase in short-run mortality
is large, potentially eliminating some of the protective benefits of additional income.
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The life cycle-permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH) is widely used in modern 
macroeconomic theory to model how households allocate consumption across time.  A key 
implication of the model is that predictable and certain changes in income should have no 
effect on consumption once they occur.  Over the past 15 years, authors have used high-
frequency survey data on consumption to test this prediction.  Among the income changes 
that have been exploited in this context are increases in union wages (Shea, 1995); a change 
in federal tax withholding (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995); changes in Social Security tax 
payments (Parker, 1999); income tax refunds (Souleles, 1999); the arrival of Social Security 
payments (Stephens, 2003); the receipt of tax stimulus checks (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 
2006); the arrival of paychecks (Stephens, 2006); and Alaska Permanent Fund dividends 
(Hsieh, 2003).  All but one of these studies (Hsieh, 2003) find consumption behavior displays 
“excess sensitivity” to expected changes in income, a result inconsistent with the LC/PIH.  
In this paper, we consider a related but largely unexplored question: if income receipt 
increases consumption, does it affect mortality?  While the potential relationship between 
consumption and mortality is obvious in cases like traffic fatalities – since increased travel 
increases the likelihood of an accident – other causes of death also have well-documented 
links to consumption.  For example, many triggers for heart attacks and strokes are activity-
related, and hence if an income payment increases economic activity, one may expect a 
higher incidence of heart attacks to follow.
1  Likewise, Ruhm (2000) shows that mortality is 
pro-cyclical, suggesting a deadly aspect to increased economic activity. 
We use various versions of the Multiple Cause of Death (MCOD) data, a census of all 
deaths in the United States, to examine the income receipt/short-run mortality link for three 
cases already considered within the LC/PIH literature, as well as two new tests.  We examine 
the mortality consequences of (1) the receipt of Social Security payments on the 3
rd of each 
month, (2) changes in the Social Security payment schedule to one based on beneficiaries’ 
dates of birth, (3) receipt of military wages on the 1
st and 15
th day of each month, (4) the 
2001 federal tax rebates, and (5) the annual Alaska Permanent Fund dividend payments. 
                                                            
1 Triggers for heart attacks include getting out of bed (Elliott, 2001), returning to work on Mondays (Witte et 
al., 2005), shoveling snow (Heppell et al. 1991), the Christmas season (Phillips et al., 2004) and physical 
exertion (Albert et al. 2000).  Similar triggers have been observed for strokes. 2 
 
In all cases, we find that mortality increases after the receipt of income.  Seniors who 
enrolled in Social Security prior to May 1997 typically received their Social Security checks 
on the 3
rd of the month.  For this group, mortality declines just before paycheck receipt, and 
is highest the day after checks are received.  For those who enrolled in Social Security after 
April 1997, benefits are paid on either the 2
nd, 3
rd or 4
th Wednesday of the month, depending 
on beneficiaries’ birth dates.  Among this group, mortality is highest on the days checks 
arrive.  Similar results are found in counties with a large military presence, with mortality 
among 17-64 year olds increasing by nearly 12 percent the day after mid-month paychecks 
arrive, while over the same period there is no change in mortality in counties with little 
military presence.  During the week the 2001 tax rebate checks arrived, mortality among 25-
64 year olds increased by 2.5 percent.  During the week that direct deposits of Permanent 
Fund dividends are made, mortality among urban Alaskans increases by 13 percent.   
Our work helps illuminate and broaden three disparate literatures.  The first is the 
literature on the LC/PIH.  Most tests of this hypothesis rely on consumption data such as that 
found in the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX).  While these datasets do a good job of 
measuring recurring monthly expenditures such as housing and car payments, they do less 
well in measuring goods that are the focus of LC/PIH tests, like alcohol and food away from 
home (Meyer and Sullivan, 2009).  In contrast, mortality is exceptionally well-measured, 
even at the daily level, and our dataset includes all deaths in the United States.  If mortality is 
viewed as an ex post measure of market activity, our results provide further evidence of 
widespread increases in economic activity after predictable changes in income. 
Second, our analysis is similar in structure and content to a related group of papers 
found in the medical literature that argues there is an increase in substance abuse-related 
mortality following payments to welfare recipients.  Sometimes called the ‘full wallets’ 
hypothesis, work by Verhuel, Singer and Christenson (1997), Maynard and Cox (2000), 
Riddell and Riddell (2006), Li et al. (2007), and especially Dobkin and Puller (2007) shows 
convincingly that problems associated with substance abuse increase after federal transfer 
program payments.  Our work demonstrates that the effect of income receipt on mortality is 
not limited to recipients of federal transfer programs and to deaths involving substance abuse.  3 
 
Finally, our work also has important implications for the large literature on income 
and health (Kitigawa and Hauser, 1973; Deaton, 2003).  While this research has established 
robust correlations, it has failed to identify the causal nature of the relationship.  The factors 
that lead one to have a high income or socioeconomic status (e.g. intelligence, discount rates) 
may also improve health outcomes.  In fact, another literature has established that negative 
health shocks reduce earnings and increase health care spending,
2 suggesting that the 
direction of causation may run from health to income.  Given this possibility of reverse 
causation and the lack of an obvious causal pathway from income to health, Deaton (2003, p. 
118) notes, “…much of the economics literature has been skeptical about any causal link 
from income to health, and instead tends to emphasize causality in the opposite direction…” 
In recent years, authors have tested whether socioeconomic status causally affects 
health by using exogenous variation in education
3 and income.
4  While the results exploiting 
exogenous variation in schooling have consistently found that education improves health, 
there are conflicting results among studies using variation in income.  Our results below may 
be instructive for this literature.  First, some of the longer-term gains from an exogenous 
increase in income may be negated by the short-run phenomena we detect.  This may explain 
why consistent results have been hard to find.  Second, these short-run effects may impact 
the efficacy of cash transfers, which some authors – despite the misgivings outlined by 
Deaton – have suggested as a way of reducing health inequalities between income levels.  
For example, a 1998 United Kingdom Government report recommended an increase in cash 
benefits as a direct way to improve health outcomes in the lowest income groups.
5  A number 
of scholars who have attempted to empirically measure the link between socioeconomic 
status and health have expressed similar sentiments.
6  Our results suggest that the negative 
short-run consequences of these transfers must be considered in any such evaluation.  
                                                            
2 For example, see Bound, 1989, Haveman et al., 1995, and especially Smith, 1999. 
3 For example, authors have examined whether health outcomes are altered by increases in education generated 
by policies such as compulsory schooling (Lleras-Muney, 2003), an increase in access to colleges (Currie and 
Moretti, 2003) and the Vietnam Draft (de Walque, 2007; Grimand and Parent, 2007).   
4 Such work exploits variation in income produced by such factors as winning the lottery (Lindahl, 2005), 
German reunification (Fritjers, Hasken-DeNew and Shields, 2005), receiving an inheritance (Meer, Miller and 
Rosen, 2003), South African pensions (Case, 2004) and changes in Social Security (Snyder and Evans, 2006).  
5 http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/doh/ih/ih.htm 
6 Marmot (2002, p. 43) notes that redistribution would improve overall health by “relieving the fate of the poor 
more than it hurt the rich."  Wilkinson (in Gly and Miliband, 1994) argues, “[t]he health evidence suggests that 4 
 
In the next section, we examine how regular payments to Social Security 
beneficiaries and military personnel affect short-term mortality.  In both cases we find large 
increases in mortality immediately after the receipt of income, and that these increases are 
not just among deaths involving substance abuse. 
Given the recurring nature of these two events, we are unable to examine whether 
increases in mortality merely reflect short-term mortality displacement: mortality has been 
hastened for people who would have died soon anyway.  In section 2, we examine this issue 
by considering the one-time receipt of 2001 tax stimulus checks and the annual receipt of 
Alaska Permanent Fund dividends.  We find in both cases that a short-term increase in 
mortality is offset by a subsequent decrease in deaths, suggesting that much of the immediate 
effect we estimate is actually short-term mortality displacement.  In section 3, we discuss the 
implications of our work for both the LC/PIH and the income/health literature.   
 
 1.    The Short-Term Mortality Consequences of Regular Income Payments 
  Existing research on the ‘full wallets’ hypothesis focuses on mortality among welfare 
recipients who are likely to have drug and alcohol problems.  In this section, we consider 
broader populations by examining the mortality consequences of Social Security payments 
and military wage payments.  We also separate substance abuse from other causes of death. 
 
1a.  Monthly Social Security Payments 
Before May 1997, all Social Security recipients received checks on the 3
rd of each 
month or on the previous work day when the 3
rd fell on a weekend or on Labor Day.  
Stephens (2003) used the structure of payments and data from the CEX to test the LC/PIH 
and finds Social Security recipients did not smooth consumption over the month, but instead 
spent more in the week after the receipt of checks compared to the week before its arrival.     
In the same way, we investigate whether Social Security recipients’ mortality 
increases immediately after they are paid.  We initially restrict our attention to before 1997, 
when all beneficiaries were on the “3
rd of the month” schedule.  Later in this section, we 
examine more recent periods using the new pay schedule.  Both tests require data on each 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
narrowing the gap in relative standards is now much more important to the quality of life in the developed 
world than further economic growth." 5 
 
decedent’s age and exact date of death.  We constructed such a data set using various 
versions of the MCOD data file.
7  The MCOD contains a unique record for each death in the 
United States.  Data are compiled by states and reported to the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS), which disseminates the data.  Each file contains information about the 
decedent, including age, gender, race, place of residence, place of death, and cause of death.  
Exact date of death was reported on public-use files from 1973 to 1988, but was removed 
from later public-use files. We obtained permission from the NCHS to use restricted-use 
versions of the MCOD files containing exact dates of death from 1989 through 2006 at their 
Research Data Center, and we pooled these data with the 1973 to 1988 public-use files.
8    
For the “3
rd of the month” analysis, we constructed a data file of all deaths from 1973 
to 1996 among those aged 65 or over.
9 The Social Security Administration reports that 
benefits were paid to 32.7 million adults aged 65 and older in 2000,
10 which is 93.5 percent 
of the population in this age group in the 2000 Census. 
Similar to Stephens (2003), we look at changes in mortality beginning 14 days prior 
to the day of Social Security payment.  As checks not paid on the 3
rd are almost always paid 
on Fridays,
11 day-of-the-week effects may obscure patterns in raw counts.  We can uncover 
these patterns, however, by regressing the natural log of daily mortality counts on weekday, 
month and year dummy variables, and averaging the residuals for the 14 days prior and the 
14 days after checks arrive.  Figure 1 shows the results from this exercise.  Movements in 
mortality among seniors are similar to the consumption patterns in Figures 1a-1d of Stephens 
(2003), in which he shows that spending in the seven days after checks arrive is higher than 
spending in the preceding seven days.  There is a large drop in mortality three days before 
checks arrive.  In most months, the checks were distributed on the 3
rd, so Day(-3) is usually 
the last day of the previous calendar month.  Phillips, Christenfeld, and Ryan (1999) and 
                                                            
7 Information about the MCOD is at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/elec_prods/subject/mortmcd.htm, and 
information about the NDI is at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/r&d/ndi/what_is_ndi.htm. 
8 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/r&d/rdc.htm. 
9 Workers can claim reduced retirement benefits at 62 and receive full benefits at between 65 and 66 years of 
age, depending on their cohort.  Song and Manchester (2007) report that from 1998 to 2005, half of Social 
Security beneficiaries enrolled at age 62 and almost all enrolled by age 65.  Therefore, we restrict our attention 
to decedents aged 65 years or more.  
10 Social Security Administration Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics, Annual Statistical Supplement 
of the Social Security Bulletin, 2001, Washington, DC: SSA, December 2001.   
11 The lone exception is that when January 3
rd is a Sunday, checks are distributed on Thursday, December 31. 6 
 
Evans and Moore (2009) document a within-month mortality cycle where deaths decline 
before the 1
st of the month and rise on the 1
st, which suggests that this mortality spike is 
partly driven by a within-month cycle.
12  Separate to this, however, is an increase in mortality 
of half a percent from the day before checks arrive to the day checks arrive. 
To comprehensively analyze the relationship between Social Security payments and 
daily mortality, we construct “synthetic” months that begin 14 days prior to the day of Social 
Security payment.
13  With this spacing, there will be an uneven number of days in our 
synthetic months, since the length of the month depends on the day on which the 3
rd falls and 
the number of days in the month.  These synthetic months can be anywhere from 28 to 34 
days in length.
14  Thus we divide each month into five groups: Payweek(-2) is the seven days 
beginning 14 days before payday and ending on the eighth day before payday; Payweek(-1) 
is the seven days prior to payday; Payweek(1) is the seven days after payday (including 
payday); Payweek(2) is the period from eight to 14 days after the paycheck arrives; and 
Payweek(3) is the extraneous days before the next synthetic month starts.  
To isolate the mortality impact of receiving a Social Security check from other 
factors, we estimate an econometric model that controls for the day-of-the-week and other 
effects.  Let Ydmy be counts of deaths for day d in synthetic month m and synthetic year y.  
Days are organized in relation to Social Security payments, so d=-1 is the day before payday, 
d=1 is payday, and so on; d extends from -14 to 20.
15   
Given this structure for the data, the econometric model we estimate is of the form: 
 
                                                            
12 Possibly due to the occurrence of payments from transfer programs like Supplemental Security Income and 
food stamps, and many bills falling due on or near the 1
st of the month. 
13 For example, January 3, 1995 is a Tuesday, so the first synthetic month of the year is December 20
th of the 
previous year through to January 19, 1995; month two is then January 20
th though February 20
th, and so on. 
14 When February 3
rd falls on a weekday, the second synthetic month of the year will only contain 28 days.  
When the 3
rd of the month falls on a Sunday in a month with 31 days, as it does in July 1994, the checks are 
distributed on July 1
st and the month spans from June 17
th to July 19
th, making the synthetic month 33 days.    
15 Years also follow this structure, so when both the January and December payments are made on the 3
rd of the 
month, the year will begin on December 20
th and will go through until December 16
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where Payweek(w) is defined as above, Weekday(j) is one of six dummy variables for the 
different days of the week, Special(j) is one of J dummy variables that capture special days 
throughout the year such as New Year’s Day and Christmas,
16 and Weeks(w) are weekly 
dummy variables created in reference to the 1
st of the calendar month.  Therefore, Week(-2) 
equals one if the day is eight to 14 days before the start of the calendar month; Week(-1) 
equals one if the day is one to seven days before the start of the month; Week(1) and Week(2) 




th days in the calendar month, respectively; and 
Week(5) is all the extra days before the 14
th day prior to the start of the next calendar month.  
The variables μm and vy capture synthetic month and year effects
17 and εdmy is an idiosyncratic 
error term.  In this equation, the reference period for the Payweek dummies is PayWeek(-1) 
and for Week dummies is Week(-1), while the reference weekday is Saturday.  We estimate 
standard errors allowing for arbitrary correlation within the days of the synthetic month. 
The results for equation (1) for decedents 65 and older from 1973 to 1996 are 
reported in the first column of Table 1.  In the first four rows of the table, we report results 
for the calendar weeks in relation to the 1
st of the month.  The results demonstrate a within-
month mortality cycle, with deaths declining the week before the 1
st and then rising 
afterwards.  Daily death rates are about three-tenths of a percent higher in the first week of 
the month compared to the previous seven days, with a p-value for the test that the null 
hypothesis is zero of less than 0.05.  In the next four rows, we show that Social Security 
payments have an effect of similar magnitude.  Deaths are about five-tenths of a percent 
higher in the seven days after check receipt compared to the preceding seven days.
18 
In column (2), we consider results for seniors aged 65 to 69.  We focus on this group 
for two reasons.  First, as we outline below, the sample used to examine the new Social 
Security payment schedule will only include those aged 65 to 69, so this will be a 
                                                            
16 We include unique dummies for a list of reoccurring special days: January 1
st and 2
nd, the Friday through 
Monday associated with federal holidays occurring on Mondays (Presidents’ Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day 
since 1986, Memorial Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day), Super Bowl Sunday and the Monday afterwards, Holy 
Thursday through Easter Sunday, July 4
th, Veteran’s Day, the Monday through Sunday of Thanksgiving, a 
dummy for all days from the day after Thanksgiving though New Year’s Eve, plus single-day dummies for 
December 24
th through December 31
st. 
17 We have estimated all models with synthetic month-year effects, μm, instead of separate synthetic month and 
year effects.  Results with this alterative specification are virtually identical to results from the more 
parsimonious specification. 
18 To provide a frame of reference, Stephens (2003) shows that the probability of any spending among all 
seniors is 1.6 percent higher in the first week after checks arrive compared to the previous seven days. 8 
 
comparable group.  Second, Evans and Moore (2009) demonstrate that the within-month 
mortality cycle – similar in scope to the effect we analyze here – is more pronounced for 
younger groups, so we will benefit from focusing on a younger group of Social Security 
recipients here.  In line with this, we find income receipt has a greater absolute impact on 
mortality on this younger group than on seniors as whole, with the coefficient on Payweek(1) 
increasing to three-quarters of a percent.   
There is also a set of decedents in this age group who should NOT be impacted by the 
“3
rd of the month” schedule, which allows us to see whether our results are spuriously 
correlated with some other effect.  Starting in May of 1997, the timing of monthly payments 
for new recipients depended on their birth dates.  Those with a birth date from the 1
st to the 
10
th are now paid on the second Wednesday of each month; those with a birth date from the 
11
th to the 20
th are paid on the third Wednesday; and those with a birth date from the 21
st to 
the 31
st are paid on the fourth Wednesday.  Those already receiving payments on the 3
rd of 
the month continued to receive checks as they had before.
19  As a falsification exercise, we 
estimate the “3
rd of the month” model on decedents who are on the new payment schedule. 
The sample we construct for this test uses deaths among 65 to 69 year olds as 
recorded in the MCOD files for 2005 and 2006, the most recent year data is available.  We 
identified decedents on the new payment schedule using the period-cohort diagram shown as 
Figure 2.  The vertical axis represents year-of-birth cohorts and the horizontal axis identifies 
the calendar year, so data elements represent a cohort’s age in a particular year.  Eligible 
beneficiaries can begin claiming benefits at age 62, and are represented by the shaded boxes 
in the table.  Song and Manchester (2007) find that nearly 100 percent of the 1937 cohort 
enrolled by age 65, so everyone below the solid line is most likely claiming benefits.  Age 
groups in the darkest grey all turned 65 prior to May of 1997, so this group is claiming under 
the old system.  The medium gray color represents people who could have enrolled in Social 
Security under either system.  The lightest gray group all turned 62 after 1997, and therefore 
are all claiming under the new system.  To ensure we have a sample of decedents paid under 
the new system, we use those aged 65 to 69 who died in the 2005 and 2006 calendar year, 
which are the groups outlined by the dotted connected lines on the right side of the graph.   
                                                            
19 http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/2007calendar.htm. 9 
 
In column (3) of Table 1 we show the results for this group.  The coefficient on 
Payweek(1) is statistically insignificant and negative.  The lack of precision for this result is 
not due to small sample sizes, for in column (4) we report results for the old payment system 
using only two years worth of data (1995-1996) for the same 65 to 69 age range and find a 
statistically significant two percent increase in daily mortality during Payweek(1). 
Next, we consider whether people receiving Social Security checks under the new 
(post-May 1997) system display a spike in mortality after they are paid.  Based on Figure 2, 
we again using data for 65 to 69 year olds in 2005 and 2006.  The restricted-use MCOD data 
identifies the decedent’s exact date of birth, which allows us to place them into three groups: 
birth dates from the 1
st to the 10
th of the month (paid on the second Wednesday of the 
month); birth dates from the 11
th to the 20
th (paid on the third Wednesday); and from the 21
st 
to the 31
st (fourth Wednesday).  For this sample, we allow the dependent variable to vary 
across days, months, years and groups (k), and estimate an equation of the form: 
 
The variables Week(w), Special(j), Weekday, μ, ν, and ε are defined as before.  In this model, 
we add effects for the birthday-based groups, and the variable Payweek(w) is now centered 
on the second, third, or fourth Wednesday of the month, depending on the group.  Synthetic 
months are uniquely defined for each birth date group (k).  Because pay dates are now fixed 
on Wednesdays, there are either 28 or 35 days in the synthetic months.  If the receipt of 
income alters short-term mortality, then the mortality cycle patterns should have shifted to 
different parts of the month for Social Security beneficiaries enrolling after May 1997. 
Results from equation (2) for 65 to 69 year olds in 2005 and 2006 are reported in the 
first column of Table 2.  There is a pronounced within-month mortality cycle, with a 
statistically significant 1.4 percent value on the Week(1) variable.  There is also a large pay 
effect: the coefficient on Payweek(1) is a statistically significant 1.1 percent.   
A shortcoming of this test is that not all recipients are paid based on their own birth 
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actually receive the check based on their spouse’s birth date.  Consequently, there is some 
measurement error across the three birth date groups – some people in each group are not 
being treated on the same schedule.  Nevertheless, people who never married should be 
claiming benefits under their own birth date, so we report results for never-married seniors 
aged 65 to 69 in the 2005 and 2006 MCOD files in column (2) of Table 2.  There is a much 
larger increase in the payday effect on mortality.  The coefficient on Payweek(1) is now 2.75 
percent, although it is a much smaller group and so the z-score is only 1.56, meaning the 
results are statistically significant at a p-value of about 0.12. 
The final two columns of the table contain the results of two placebo tests.  First, we 
re-estimate the model from equation (2) by imposing the new payment schedule on decedents 
aged 65 to 69 in 1995 and 1996, who would have been on the old payment system.  The 
Payweek(1) variable should be small and statistically insignificant in this case, and it is.  
Second, we estimate the same model for decedents aged 50 to 59 in 2005 and 2006, a group 
not enrolled in Social Security.  As expected, we find no impact on Payweek(1).  In both 
columns (3) and (4), we document large and statistically significant within-month cycles. 
As we noted above, the work linking mortality to income payments has to date 
primarily focused on the impact on substance abuse related deaths.  In this section, we 
estimate models for causes both related and unrelated to substance abuse.  Causes of death in 
the MCOD files are defined using the International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes.  
Three different ICD versions are used during the period we consider: ICD-8 (1973-8), ICD-9 
(1979-98), and ICD-10 (1999-2006).  The codes used to identify substance abuse vary across 
versions, so for the “3
rd of the month” analysis we use ICD-9 data from 1979 to 1996.  The 
primary aim of this analysis is to see whether the increase in deaths is solely explained by 
substance abuse, so we err on the side of defining too many deaths as substance abuse-
related, rather than too few.  Each death has an underlying cause as well as up to 19 other 
causes, and we define a substance abuse death as one in which any of the causes has an ICD-
9 code associated with substance abuse.  The list of causes defined as substance abuse is the 
same list used by Phillips et al. (1999), and the causes used by studies on the economic costs 
of substance abuse in the United States (Harwood, Fountain, and Livermore, 1998), Australia 11 
 
(Collins and Lapsley, 2002), and Canada (Single et al., 1999).
20  We classify approximately 
one percent of deaths among seniors in 1979 to 1996 as substance abuse deaths. 
Column (1) of Table 3 contains estimates for equation (1) for all causes of death 
among seniors during the ICD-9 reporting period of 1979-1996.  These results are similar to 
those in Table 1.  We report results for substance abuse in column (2), and find a pronounced 
within-month mortality cycle – the Week(1) coefficient is 1.90 percent, with a p-value of only 
0.11.  There is also a large coefficient (standard error) on the Payweek(1) variable of 0.0367 
(0.0112).  In column (3) we re-estimate the model using non-substance abuse deaths.  These 
deaths represent 99 percent of all deaths from column (1), so it is no surprise that the results 
in columns (1) and (3) are virtually identical.  The results in columns (2) and (3) indicate 
that, compared to the week prior to payday, there are about 117 excess substance-abuse 
related deaths each year compared to 1,236 excess deaths from non-substance abuse causes.  
Even with some under-reporting of substance abuse causes, these results suggest that the 
effect of income on mortality extends well beyond substance abuse, and in fact that substance 
abuse deaths are responsible for a minority of the aggregate pattern. 
In the final three columns of Table 3, we use both ICD-8 and ICD-9 to create a few 
broad underlying cause-of-death categories.  For each cause, we estimate equation (1) for 
decedents 65 and older for the entire 1973-1996 period.
21  In column (4), we present results 
for external causes of death (e.g., accidents, murders, suicides, motor vehicle crashes), and 
find both a large within-month effect (coefficient and standard error on Week(1) is 0.0257 
(0.0059)) and a large pay week effect (coefficient and standard error on Payweek(1) is 0.0410 
(0.0057)).  In column (5), we present results for heart attacks, a cause often associated with a 
short time from onset to death.  The pay week coefficients are slightly larger for heart attacks 
than for all deaths (as reported in column (1) of Table 1).  Finally, in column (6), we report 
results for cancer – a cause of death we can view as a placebo test, because cancer deaths are 
far less affected by activity levels than most other causes.  We do not find either a pay week 
or within-month cycle for cancer, as the results for Payweek(1) and Week(1) demonstrate. 
                                                            
20 A complete list of these codes is provided in an appendix that is available from the authors.   
21 The NCHS recoded ICD-8 and ICD-9 deaths into 34 underlying causes.  Our external causes group consists 
of deaths with codes 33 to 36.  Heart attacks (acute myocardial infarctions) have an underlying cause of death 
code of 410 in both ICD-8 and ICD-9.  The cancer category was created using a cause of death recode produced 
by the National Cancer Institute (available at http://seer.cancer.gov/codrecode/1969+_d09172004/index.html). 12 
 
 
1b.  The Military Payment Schedule 
Military personnel are paid on the 1
st and the 15
th of each month, or on the previous 
business day when these dates fall on a weekend or a public holiday.
22  In this section, we 
examine whether mortality spikes on or immediately after these dates.  Parker (1999), 
Stephens (2006), and Browning and Collado (2001) use the receipt of earnings to test the 
LC/PIH, with the first two studies finding consumption was excessively sensitive to income 
receipt.  In this section, we compare mortality patterns in counties with and without a high 
proportion of their population on active military duty. 
Military personnel are predominantly male (currently 85 percent), young 
(approximately one half are under 25 years of age) and healthy (Segal and Segal, 2004).  
Between 1973 and 1990 there were anywhere from 2.04 to 2.25 million military personnel in 
the US, before falling to 1.38 million in 2001 and then increasing slightly thereafter.
23  
Soldiers normally reside on or near the base to which they are attached, and these bases are 
unevenly distributed throughout the country.  Since both the size of the military and base 
locations were fairly uniform over the 1973 to 1988 period, and the public-use MCOD files 
contain exact dates of death during this time, we focus on that time period in this section. 
We generate a military working-age sample of 17 to 64 year olds.
24  Using 
information from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census Summary File 3 data sets,
25 we identified 
counties with more than 15 percent of their population aged 17 to 64 who were military 
personnel in all three Censuses.
26  There are 21 counties that meet this criterion
27 and in 1990 
and there were roughly 326,000 people aged 17 to 64 in these “military” counties,
 of which 
about one quarter were in the military.  Military personnel have a large number of dependents 
                                                            
22 We can date this policy as early as 1971, https://www.usna.com/SSLPage.aspx?pid=6121 but no older 
veteran or military expert we spoke with could remember a time when wages were not paid on these two dates. 
23 Authors’ calculations from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States.   
24 Enlistment in the military can occur at age 17 years with parental consent, and at age 18 years without. 
25 These data are taken from the National Historical Geographic Information System. 
26 Counties that changed boundaries between 1970 and 1990 were merged prior to this exercise (changes are at 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/WONDER/help/Census1970-2000.HTML).  There were many changes to Alaska’s 
county-equivalent geographic boundaries over this period, so we did not use Alaskan deaths in this analysis.   
27 The States (Counties) in our sample are: AL (Dale), GA(Chattahoochee, Liberty), ID (Elmore), KS (Geary, 
Riley), KY (Christian, Hardin), LA (Vernon), MO (Pulaski), NE (Sarpy), NC (Cumberland, Onslow), OK 
(Comanche, Jackson), SC (Beaufort), TN (Montgomery), TX (Bell, Coryell, VA (Norfolk City), WA (Island). 13 
 
and bases typically employ many civilians paid on the same schedule,
28 so the proportion of 
the population who would have been affected by the military payment schedule in these areas 
will be much higher than 25 percent.  We compare the mortality patterns for people from this 
group of counties with a comparison sample of people from 2,772 “nonmilitary” counties 
that have less than one percent military among adults aged 17 to 64 in the same censuses.   
While the widespread nature of the within-month mortality cycle may mean military 
and non-military counties exhibit a similar time series in mortality counts around the 1
st of 
the month, we expect a much greater frequency of paycheck distributions around the 15
th in 
military counties compared to non-military counties because the predominant payment 
frequency outside the military is weekly or biweekly.
29 
In Figure 3, we use data from the 1973-1988 MCOD to construct the relative daily 
mortality risk for our sample for the seven days before and after military paychecks are 
distributed. The solid line in the graph represents the daily mortality risk for military counties 
and the dotted line is for non-military counties.  The vertical lines from each point represent 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the daily mortality risk. 
The two groups show similar pattern around the first payday of the month.  There is a 
within-month mortality cycle for both military and nonmilitary counties, with deaths 
declining before checks arrive and rebounding afterwards (perhaps accentuated by weekend 
days disproportionately coming after payments).  The day after military paychecks arrive is 
the peak mortality day for both groups in this two-week cycle. Compared to the day before 
payment (Payday -1), deaths the day after payment (Payday 2) are 9.3 percent higher in 
military counties and 6.4 percent higher in nonmilitary counties.  For all days throughout this 
two-week period we cannot reject the null that both groups have the same mortality risks.  
The pattern is more pronounced for military counties around the arrival of the second 
paycheck.  The day prior to the second wage payment, there is a drop in daily mortality of 
5.6 percent in the military counties compared with 2 percent in nonmilitary counties.  
Likewise, mortality is 9.6 percent higher in military counties on the day after the second 
paycheck of the month arrives while the comparison counties show a 1.8 percent excess 
                                                            
28 Data from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States indicate that during our analysis 
period, about one million civilians were employed annually by the military.   
29 Data from the 1996-2004 Diary Survey Record of the CEX indicate that only 9.6 percent of workers report 
their last pay check as being paid monthly, while only 5.5 percent report being paid twice-monthly. 14 
 
mortality on this day.  For the day after the second paycheck is distributed, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the mortality rates are the same on the military and nonmilitary counties.   
To formally test whether military and nonmilitary counties exhibit different mortality 
patterns around the 1
st and 15
th of the month, we estimate a model similar to equation (1).  A 
key difference is that we use a negative binomial model that allows for integer values and 
estimate it by maximum likelihood (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984), because daily 
mortality counts in the military counties are small and occasionally zero.  Let Yidmy be daily 
mortality counts for group i (for military and nonmilitary counties) on day d, month m and 
year y.  Let Xidmy be vector that captures the exogenous variables in equation (1).  Within the 
negative binomial model, E[Yidmy | Xidmy ] = δexp(Xidmy β), where δ is a parameter that 
captures whether the data exhibits over-dispersion.
30  By definition, ∂ln E[Yidmy | Xidmy ]/∂ 
Xidmy = β so the parameters in this model are interpreted similarly to those in equation (1).   
In constructing the data set, the “synthetic” months are 28-day periods that include 
the seven days before and after the two military checks are distributed each month, and begin 
seven days before the first payment each month.
31   When the 1
st or the 15
th of the month are 
on a weekend or a public holiday, wages are paid on the closest prior working day.
32  
The exact specification for equation Xidmyβ is of the form: 
                                                            
30 It can be demonstrated that the variance of counts in the negative binomial model is Var[Yidmy | Xidmy ]= δ
2 
[1+(1/δ)]exp(Xidmy β), so the variance to mean ratio in this model is δ +1.  When δ>0 the variance grows faster 
than the mean and the data exhibit over-dispersion and when δ=0 the negative binomial collapses to a Poisson 
model which by construction restricts the variance to equal the mean.   
31 Days outside of the 28-day pay periods are dropped from the analysis.  The two pay periods in each month do 
not overlap, except when Presidents Day falls on the 15
th of February and the seven days after the previous 
wage payment overlaps with the seven days before this payment.  The 28 days around these two payments (25
th 
January–18
th February) is removed when this happens in 1982 and 1988. 
32 The relevant public holidays that alter payments in this section are New Year’s Day, Presidents Day, Labor 

















dmy j dmy j
jj
idmy idmy d md idmy idmy d md
dd
dd
idmy idmy d nd
d
d
Weekday j Special j
Military Period Payday Military Period Payday




















1( 1 ) ( )
idmy idmy d nd
d
d
idmy p idmy m idmy idmy m m y
itary Period Payday








where Weekday, Special, and the fixed month and year effects are defined as before.  We 
control for differences across groups with a dummy for counts in military areas (Military), 
across pay periods with a dummy for the first pay period (Period1), and also interact these 
two variables. The variables Payday are a series of 13 dummy variables defined for the seven 
days before and seven days after wage payments except for Payday(-1), which is the day 
before checks are distributed.  We add Nonmilitary and Period2 dummies, and estimate four 
vectors of coefficients on the payday variables: one for military and nonmilitary counties 
around the first pay period of the month (β1md and β1nd, respectively) then similar values for 
the second pay period (β2md and β2nd).  We examine whether the daily mortality patterns differ 
across the two groups by testing the null hypothesis Ho: βjnd = βjmd for all Payday(d).   
The maximum likelihood results for the negative binomial model are reported in 
Table 4.  Columns (1) and (2) present the coefficients on the payday dummies for the first 
pay period, for military counties and non-military counties respectively. Column (3) reports 
the p-value on the -2 log-likelihood test statistic for the null hypothesis that military and non-
military coefficients for a particular day are equal. The final three columns repeat the same 
set of results for the second payday near the 15
th of the month.  Standard errors allow for 
arbitrary correlation across observations within the same 28-day synthetic month.   
The results in Table 4 correspond with the visual evidence in Figure 3.  In the first 
pay period, deaths are lowest in both sets of counties the day before paychecks arrive and 
highest the day after paychecks arrive, with deaths increasing by a statistically insignificant 
4.7 percent in military counties and a statistically significant 2.1 percent in nonmilitary 
counties.  The difference between the two sets of counties is not statistically significant.   
The differences are clearer in the second pay period.  There is a large decline in 
mortality the day before the mid-month check arrives in military counties, as evidenced by 16 
 
the large positive coefficients before and after Payday(-1).  Mortality is 6.3 percent higher 
the day checks arrive compared to the day before (p-value of 0.085).  The corresponding 
numbers for Payday(2) and Payday(3) are 11.8 percent (p-value < 0.001) and 5.6 percent (p-
value of 0.125), respectively.  In contrast, in nonmilitary counties, the coefficients on these 
same three dummy variables are smaller than four-tenths of a percent.  For Payday(1) and 
Payday(2), we can reject the null at the 0.05 level that the coefficients are the same across 
military and nonmilitary counties, while the p-value for this test on Payday(3) is 0.11.
33   
As in the previous section, we identify deaths related and unrelated to substance 
abuse using the same ICD-9 codes.  Between 1979 and 1988, approximately 10 percent of 
deaths among those aged 17 to 64 are defined as substance abuse deaths.  There were 9.9 
deaths per day in military counties during this period, with 8.8 deaths per day unrelated to 
substance abuse.  In a negative binomial model of the non-substance abuse deaths, the 
coefficients (standard errors) on Payday(1) through Payday(3) for the paycheck near the 15
th 
of the month for military counties are 0.0537 (0.0441), 0.0818 (0.0437) and 0.0675 (0.0433), 
respectively.  The t-ratios for Payday(2) and (3) are 1.87 and 1.54 respectively. The same set 
of coefficients for non-military counties are   -0.0055 (0.0044), 0.0045 (0.0044), and 0.0013 
(00047), and the p-values on the tests that the daily effects are the same across the two 
groups for the three days are 0.18, 0.08, and 0.13.  While we still see large increases in non-
substance abuse deaths, the accuracy of each estimate has decreased and the test identifying 




33 The results move in the expected direction as we change the criteria for what constitutes a military county.  If 
we only include as treated counties as those where the fraction of adults aged 17 to 64 must exceed 20 percent, 
average daily mortality falls to about 7 which should increase standard errors (because we increase the 
variability of daily deaths) but the coefficients should increase (as the counties have a higher fraction of treated 
people).  This is close to what we find.  The coefficients (standard errors) [p values on test of equality] for 
Payday 1, 2 and 3 in the second payday among military counties in this new sample are:  0.0840 (0.0439) 
[0.025], 0.1104 (0.0394) [0.006], and 0.0587 (0.0422) [0.160].  If we reduce the required fraction of adults in 
the military to 10 percent, the number of counties rise, the average daily deaths are now 16.2, meaning standard 
errors should fall as the day to day variance in death rates declines but coefficients also decrease as the 
impacted fraction of the population falls.  This is exactly what we find.  The coefficients (standard errors) [p 
values on test of equality] for Payday 1, 2 and 3 in the second payday among military counties in this new 
sample are:  0.0638 (0.0288) [0.010], 0.0672 (0.0262) [0.015], and 0.0559 (0.0287) [0.041]. 
34 Given the smaller sample size and the small number of deaths per day for substance abuse deaths, none of the 
coefficients on the Payday(d) variables were statistically significant.   17 
 
2.  The Mortality Consequences of One-time and Infrequent Income Receipt 
In the previous section, we demonstrated that mortality increases immediately after 
income receipt. The periodic nature of Social Security and military payments did not allow 
us to determine whether the increases merely represent “short-term mortality displacement” 
where the deaths of the frail were hastened by a few days, a phenomenon routinely referred 
to as “harvesting” (Zeger et al., 1999).   In this section, we use two new events to examine 
how much of the short-term mortality increase represents displacement.   
  
2a.  The 2001 Tax Rebates 
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
35 was signed into law on 
June 7, 2001 and included a reduction in the tax rate on the lowest income bracket from 15 to 
10 percent.  This tax change was applied retroactively for income earned in 2001 and, as an 
advance payment on the tax cut, households were sent rebate based on their 2000 tax returns 
in the summer and fall of 2001.  Approximately two-thirds of all households in the United 
States received a rebate check.  The maximum rebates for single and married taxpayers were 
$300 and $600, respectively.  Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) estimate households 
received about $500 on average, or about one percent of median annual family income. 
Rebate checks were mailed over a ten-week period and check distribution dates were 
based on the second-to-last digit of the Social Security number (SSN) of the person filing the 
taxes.
36  The first checks were sent on Monday, July 23, to taxpayers whose second-to-last 
SSN digit was a zero.
37  Table 6 shows the exact distribution dates of checks by SSN.  The 
Treasury Department sent letters to taxpayers a few weeks before checks arrived informing 
them of the size and date of their check (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006). 
This tax rebate is a powerful quasi-experiment for testing the LC/PIH, as the second-
to-last digit of the SSN is effectively randomly assigned.
38  Johnson, Parker and Souleles 
                                                            
35 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ16/pdf/PLAW-107publ16.pdf. 
36 For married taxpayers filing jointly, the first Social Security number on the return determined mailing date. 
37 Households who filed their year 2000 tax return late may have been sent their rebates after the ten-week 
period shown in Table 7.  According to Slemrod et al. (1997) 92 percent of taxpayers typically file on or before 
the normal April 15 deadline, so the vast majority of households would have received their checks according to 
the schedule outlined in Table 7. 
38 Geographic areas determine the first three digits of Social Security Number, a group determines the middle 
two digits, and the last four digits are assigned sequentially, so are effectively random.  The second-to-last digit 18 
 
(2006) use this fact and data from a special module in the CEX to show that consumption of 
nondurable goods increased in the months after the arrival of checks.  Using data on SSNs of 
credit card holders, Agarwal, Chiu and Souleles (2007) found that households initially used 
rebate money to reduce credit card debt, but soon afterward increased their credit card 
spending by amounts comparable to the initial payments.  In contrast to these results, Shapiro 
and Slemrod (2003) found a minority of households planned to spend their rebate. 
  We use the check distribution schedule to examine the short-run consequences of the 
rebates on mortality. For this project, the NCHS merged the second-to-last digit of a 
decedent’s SSN from the National Death Index (NDI)
39 to the 2000-2002 MCOD data files.   
The econometric model for this event is straightforward.  Let i =0 to 9 index groups 
of people based on the second-to-last digit of their SSN.  Let t index one of 30 7-day periods 
during the spring through fall of 2001, with the first period beginning on Monday May 14
th 
and the last beginning on December 3
rd.  This 30-week period starts ten weeks prior to the 
first check being distributed and ends ten weeks after the last check was sent.  Let yit be the 
deaths for group i in week t and let REBATE1it be a dummy variable that equals one for the 
week group i received a check. The estimating equation is then 
1 (4) ln( ) 1 it it i t it Y REBATE     
where υi  are fixed week effects, ηj are fixed group effects and εij is a random error term.  The 
group effects identify persistent differences in weekly mortality counts that vary across 
groups, but since the second-to-last digit of a SSN is randomly assigned there should be little 
difference in mortality rates across groups.  The week effects capture the differences that are 
common to all groups but vary across weeks.  For example, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
occurred during Week 18 in our analysis.  The Centers for Disease Control estimates that 
there were 2,902 deaths associated with September 11
th, which is roughly twenty percent of 
weekly deaths during this period.
40  There also appears to be a drop in mortality in the weeks 
just after September 11
th as individuals stayed home and reduced their travel.  The week 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
mailing system was in fact chosen because it was felt the random assignation made it a fair way to allocate the 
checks (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006).  
39 The NDI is an index of death record information designed to assist medical and health researchers who want 
to ascertain whether subjects in their studies have died, and includes each decedent’s SSN.  More information 
about the NDI can be found at www.cdc.gov/nchs/ndi.htm. 
40 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm51SPa6.htm. 19 
 
effects will capture these cyclic changes in mortality so long as the deaths associated with 
September 11 are equally distributed across the 10 SSN groups.  The coefficient on β1 is the 
key variable of interest and it identifies the short-run impact of the rebates on mortality.  
There are two caveats to equation (4).  First, only taxpaying units with taxable income 
in 2000 received a tax rebate in 2001.  The coefficient on β1 represents a reduced-form effect 
and not the impact of actually receiving a check.  Therefore, a key to the analysis is to reduce 
the sample to people likely to have received a tax rebate.  We do this by restricting the 
sample to those aged 25 to 64, who are much more likely to have paid taxes than other 
groups such as seniors.
41  Second, for married couples filing jointly, the rebate check was 
sent according to the SSN of the first name on the IRS 1040 form.  This form does not record 
the sex of the taxpayers so we have no idea whether husband or wives are more likely to be 
listed as the first taxpayer.  Although both partners in a marriage are presumably treated by 
the additional income, the mailing of the check was based on the SSN of only one of them.  
Since people not sent a check but treated with a rebate through their spouse should be 
randomly distributed across the different groups, this should systematically bias our results 
towards zero.  Later, we consider models where we reduce the sample to unmarried 
taxpayers, a group where we should better identify rebate recipients. 
The results for equation (4) are reported in Table 6.  The SSN groups experience a 
statistically significant 2.7 percent increase in mortality in the week the checks arrive.  There 
is a large p-value on the test that all the group fixed effects are zero, adding empirical support 
to the assumption that the second-to-last digit of the SSN is randomly assigned.  Overall, the 
results suggest a large short-term increase in mortality immediately after income receipt.   
While we anticipate there is some autocorrelation in mortality rates, Monte Carlo 
estimates suggest that Huber/White-type procedures allowing for arbitrary correlation in 
errors perform poorly when the number of groups is small (Wooldridge, 2003).  While we 
could employ an AR(1), the residuals from column (1) of Table 6 regressed on a one-period 
lag (deleting the first observation in each group) generate an estimate of the AR(1) 
                                                            
41 The IPUMS-CPS project (King et al., 2004) has attached estimates of taxable income to March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data.  Using data from the 2001 March CPS (2000 tax year), their estimates suggest 
that 52 percent of people aged 25-64 were in households that paid federal income taxes but this same number 
for people aged 65 and older was 26 percent. 20 
 
coefficient (standard error) of 0.0085 (0.0584), which suggests that autocorrelation is not a 
problem in this relatively young group of decedents.   
In column (2) of Table 6, we add REBATE2, REBATE3, and REBATE4, which are 
dummies for the second, third and fourth week after the checks arrive, respectively, to 
examine whether the increase in mortality in the first week represents mortality 
displacement.  If there is significant short-term displacement, then we should find that the 
sum of the coefficients in subsequent weeks should be negative and close in magnitude to the 
estimate for REBATE1.   Notice that in the third week after the checks arrive there is a large 
drop in mortality that is similar in magnitude to the coefficient on REBATE1.  Adding the 
REBATE1 through REBATE3 coefficients in column (2), we get an estimated change 
(standard error) in mortality of -0.0151 (0.0194).  In this instance, we cannot reject the null of 
no aggregate change in mortality over the first three weeks after checks arrive. 
We define substance abuse-related deaths using the ICD-10 codes in a similar way as 
in the previous two sections, and allocate eight percent of deaths in this sample to substance 
abuse, which represents 85 deaths per group per week.
42  Column (3) of Table 6 contains the 
results for substance abuse deaths, and only the negative coefficient on REBATE4 approaches 
statistical significance. Column (4) contains results for deaths not related to substance abuse, 
and the results are nearly identical to the results for all deaths in column (2), showing once 
again a relatively minor role for substance abuse in the aggregate relationship. 
In the final two columns of Table 3, we re-estimate the model eliminating all data 
after week 17, which are observations after the September 11
th attacks.  The results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained in the first two columns.   
As noted above, we can more accurately identify who receives the check by 
restricting the sample to never-married, widowed, divorced and separated taxpayers.
43  
Among non-married adults aged 25 to 64, the IPUMS March CPS data estimates that 67 
percent paid taxes in 2000.  Restricting the sample to the unmarried generates similar results, 
with the coefficient (standard error) on REBATE1 of 0.0280 (0.0134).  
                                                            
42 The list of ICD-10 codes comes from the Australian study (Collins and Lapsley, 2002) and updates of the 
United States (available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/economic_costs.pdf) and Canadian 
studies (available at http://www.ccsa.ca/Eng/Priorities/Research/CostStudy/Pages/default.aspx). 
43 The exception would be people who became divorced, separated or widowed since filing their year 2000 tax 
return, which should be a small number of people. 21 
 
While reducing the sample to specific causes of death produces few statistically 
significant coefficients due to the increased variance associated with disaggregated causes of 
death, results suggest causes related to activity and consumption levels drive the aggregate 
pattern.
44  Importantly, we find no impact of the rebates on single-cause cancer deaths
45 
(coefficient and standard error on REBATE1 of 0.0010 (0.0268)) and no effect when we 
estimate two placebo regressions using the same periods and group definitions as 2001, but 
re-estimated using 2000 and 2002 MCOD data.  The coefficients (standard error) on 
REBATE1 in these two models are 0.0094 (0.0102) and -0.0174 (0.0102), respectively. 
 
2b.   Dividend Payments from the Alaska Permanent Fund 
The Alaska Permanent Fund was established in 1976 to invest income received by the 
State of Alaska from the sale of oil, gas, and other minerals for the long-term benefit of 
current and future Alaskans.  The fund has grown significantly over time, and had assets 
worth approximately $35.9 billion at the end of the 2008 financial year.
46  Since 1982, an 
annual dividend has been paid to Alaskans from the average income generated by fund 
investments during the previous five years.  The amount paid has been between $331 in 1984 
and $2,069 in 2008 (when a one-off additional payment of $1,200 was also made). 
Alaska residents who have lived in the state for at least one year are eligible for the 
dividend, and the same amount is paid to everyone, regardless of their length of residency, 
age, or income.
47  Individuals must apply each year to receive the dividend, and at least 88 
percent of Alaskans have received the dividend each year.  Table 7 contains the dividend 
amounts and the percentage of the population receiving them in recent years. 
Hsieh (2003) uses variation in the size of dividends by family size and over time to 
test whether nondurable consumption changes in response to dividend payments.  Using the 
                                                            
44 The coefficients (standard errors) on REBATE1 and REBATE2 for regressions using weekly counts for 
particular causes (ICD-10 codes) are as follows:  Liver disease and cirrhosis (K70, K73-4), 0.0714 (0.0405) and 
-0.0675 (0.0633); heart attacks (I21), 0.0356 (0.0270) and -0.0376 (0.0269); and traffic accidents (code 38 in 
the NCHS 39-cause recode), 0.0399 (0.0411), and 0.006 (0.030). 
45 The cancer category was created using the same underlying cause of death recode used in Section 2.  There 
was an increase in all cancer deaths in the week checks arrived, but once this category was limited to deaths 
where cancer was the only cause then this effect disappeared.  
46 From the 2008 Annual Report of the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation.  Available at: 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/reportspublications/reportArchive.cfm. 
47 Residency requirements have been the same since 1990.  Minor changes occurred in earlier years. 
Historical information is at: https://www.pfd.state.ak.us/historical/index.aspx 22 
 
CEX from the 1984 to 2001, he finds no evidence households react to these payments – even 
though household consumption is sensitive to income tax refunds – which leads him to 
conclude that households adhere to the LC/PIH for large and predictable payments (like the 
Alaska dividend), but not for small and less predictable payments (like income tax refunds). 
The recent years of the Permanent Fund payments provide an opportunity to explore 
the short-term relationship between income payments and mortality.  Payments were initially 
made entirely by check, mailed at a rate of 50,000 per week.  Payment by direct deposit was 
introduced in 1993.  Approximately 30 percent of recipients initially received their dividend 
this way, which grew to two-thirds of recipients by 2001 and three-quarters by 2006.  Direct 
deposits are made on only one or two dates, and since at least 2000, over 90 percent of paper 
checks have been processed and mailed in a single batch shortly after the payment of direct 
deposits.  The exact dates that direct deposits were paid, as well as the dates checks were 
issued, are shown in Table 7 for the years 2000 to 2006.  We use the timing of direct deposits 
from 2000 through 2006 to investigate whether dividend payments change mortality patterns 
among Alaskans.  We focus on this period because of the popularity of direct deposit and the 
close proximity between the receipt of direct deposits and paper checks.
48  
The primary data for this analysis are from the MCOD restricted-use files from 2000 
through 2006, which include decedents’ state of residence.  We create separate weekly 
counts of deaths for Alaskans and residents of the rest of the United States for periods that 
include the direct dividend payments and several weeks afterwards.
49   
Residuals from a simple regression using these data show an increase in Alaskan 
deaths at the point of direct deposit payments.  In Figure 4 is the result of creating weekly 
counts of deaths in each state of residence for annual ten-week periods that begin fifteen days 
after Labor Day, regressing these counts against week-year dummies and dummies for each 
state in a negative binomial model of the type used in section 1, and then calculating the 
mean residuals in terms of when Permanent Fund payments arrive.  Deaths in Alaska deviate 
                                                            
48 Since 1998, the estates of Alaskans who applied for the dividend in March but died prior to its payment 
around October have received the full amount.  Using this time period therefore also allows us to rule out any 
bequest-related “death elasticity” of the sort suggested by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003). 
49 Alaska has a disproportionate number of aircraft and fishing accidents (Baker et al., 1992).  Fatalities from 
these events can be significant relative to the number of deaths in Alaska in any single week.  To decrease the 
variation in weekly deaths, in both the Alaskan and non-Alaskan groups we remove deaths with an Underlying 
Cause-of-Death 358 Recode of 400 (Water transport accidents) or 401 (Air and space transport accidents).   23 
 
most from trends in other states in a positive direction in the week dividends are paid, and in 
a negative direction two weeks later.  This is consistent with an increase in deaths when 
income is paid which largely displaces mortality which would have occurred soon after. 
The econometric model here is a simple difference-in-difference specification, with 
treatments occurring at particular times of the year in Alaska.  The data for the rest of the 
U.S. provides an estimate of the time path that would occur in the absence of the dividend 
intervention.  Let w denote twelve seven-day periods that begin on Tuesdays,
50 with the first 
period each year beginning fifteen days after Labor Day, the first Monday in September.
51  
Let ln(yswy) be the natural log of the deaths for state s (with s=1 for Alaska or s=0 for all other 
states) in week w and year y.  Dividend(1) is a dummy that equals one the first week after 
dividend payments are made and zero otherwise, and Alaska is a dummy variable for the 
state of interest. The model we estimate is: 
 
where νwy is a fixed effect that varies by week w and year y, and εswy is a random error.  The 
Alaska dummy variable controls for persistent differences in mortality counts between 
Alaska and the rest of the United States.  The fixed week/year effects capture differences 
common to both groups, but which vary over time.  The parameter β1 captures the short-run 
impact of the dividend payments on mortality.  As in the previous section, we examine 
whether estimated mortality effects for the week after payments are made are the result of 
harvesting by including Alaska*Dividend(2) to Alaska*Dividend(4) in subsequent models.  
The results for equation (5) are reported in Table 8.  In the first two columns, we 
report results for models using all Alaskan deaths.  In column (1), we only include 
Alaska*Dividend(1); in column (2), we include Alaska*Dividend(2) to Alaska*Dividend(4) 
as well.  The results for the Alaska Permanent Fund tell a story similar to the one told by the 
results for the 2001 tax rebate.  In column (1), we see a large immediate increase in deaths of 
6.7 percent for the week checks are received, but the result is not statistically significant.  
The results in column (2) suggest substantial harvesting, with the coefficients on 
                                                            
50 All direct deposits during 2000 to 2006 were made on Tuesdays, Wednesdays or Thursdays. 
51 We select the post-Labor day period for this analysis because daily mortality counts in the end of August and 
the first two weeks of September were incredibly volatile and did not match the trends in mortality counts for 
residents from other states. 
13 (5) ln( ) (1) swy wy s s wy swy Y Dividend Alaska Alaska        24 
 
Alaska*Dividend(2) and (3) being -2.6 percent and -9.5 percent, respectively.  This final 
number has a t-statistic of 1.77, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
With about one-fifth of the land mass as the continental United States but only 
670,000 residents, Alaska is the most sparsely populated state.  A large fraction of residents 
live in remote areas, and have limited access to the Internet, banking services, the postal 
service, etc.
52  In conversations with representatives of the Alaska permanent fund, they 
indicated that a much larger fraction of the direct deposit recipients live in the urban areas of 
Alaska.  In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, we restrict our attention to residents in the 
boroughs that contain Anchorage (260,283 residents in 2000 Census), Fairbanks (30,224) and 
Juneau (30,711), the only cities with more than 10,000 residents.
53  In this model, we keep 
the same comparison group of non-Alaskan residents, as nearly everyone in the United States 
lives in a county with a town of more than 10,000 people.
  
In this urban sample, there is a 12 percent increase in mortality the week direct 
deposit occurs.  The p-value on this statistic is less than 0.10.  As in both column (2) and the 
case of the 2001 tax rebates, we see a drop in mortality the third week after dividends are 
paid, suggesting a large fraction of these deaths represent short-term mortality displacement.  
In this instance, however, the increase in mortality does not appear to be entirely harvesting.  
The sum of the coefficients over the first three weeks after checks arrive is 0.068, and over 
the first four weeks is 0.149, although neither sum is statistically significant. 
As with the previous tests, the results are not due to substance abuse.  Using the same 
ICD-10 coding as in the tax rebate section, we attribute 8 percent of deaths among Alaskans 
to substance abuse.  The impact of the Permanent Fund payments on non-substance abuse 
deaths, reported in columns (5) and (6), is similar to the corresponding values for deaths in 
columns (3) and (4).
54  The coefficient on Dividend(1) is 0.1304 and its t-statistic is 1.62, so 
the p-value for the test that this coefficient is zero is 0.11.  In this case, the sum of the 
coefficients on Dividends(1) through (3) is 0.116, which is again statistically insignificant.   
                                                            
52 Data from the 2000 Census indicates 16.5 percent live in areas with fewer than 1,000 people or in no defined 
place. 
53 Alaska is organized into boroughs, which are equivalent to counties and form the basis for the Federal 
Information Processing System (FIPS) codes in the state.  The restricted-use MCOD data identifies the FIPS 
code of residence for all decedents over this time period. 
54 There are too few substance abuse-related deaths in Alaska to estimate the impact of dividend payments. 25 
 
3. Discussion 
  Many authors have demonstrated that consumption increases after individuals receive 
an expected infusion of cash.  In this paper, we returned to three tests of the LC/PIH and 
developed two others to document the mortality consequences of this excess sensitivity.  We 
find that mortality increases after the receipt of income for a wide variety of payments: 
transfer payments, paychecks, one-time cash bonuses, and annual residency-based dividends.   
Changing levels of consumption/activity is the most plausible mechanism through 
which income receipt affects mortality.  The findings for particular causes of death are 
consistent with this, for both when we observe a relationship – like we do for heart attacks 
and traffic accidents – and when we do not, as with the tests using cancer deaths. 
Two alternative reasons for such a relationship are improbable.  First, the change to 
the Social Security payment schedule and the structure of the 2001 tax rebates allow us to 
rule out within-month or seasonal factors that coincide with income receipt.  Second, the 
criteria for receiving these payments should not encourage people to improperly record dates 
of death for financial gain.  Payments to Social Security beneficiaries cease the month after 
death,
55 a deceased applicant's Permanent Fund dividends go to their estate, military wages 
are already earned and the tax rebates were based on tax returns from the previous year.   
  Before discussing some implications, it is important to stress that we cannot say 
anything about whether people are maximizing their own welfare.  Non-smoothing 
consumption behavior is consistent with a number of utility maximization models, including 
hyperbolic discounting (Shapiro, 2005).  Moreover, increased mortality does not necessarily 
reflect contemporaneous poor health: those whose deaths have been hastened by a few days 
may have been in poor health already, and external causes of death are largely unconnected 
to short-term variation in a person's health.  At this point it is hard to judge the value of 
shifting to smaller, more frequent income payments.  
  It is also difficult to assess the role of income levels and liquidity constraints, as our 
tests use partially-treated populations.  What is striking, however, is that similar results are 
found across a wide range of demographic groups, with our tests covering seniors, working-
age taxpayers, predominantly younger military personnel, and all of the residents in one state.  
                                                            
55 www.ssa.gov/pubs/10008.html 26 
 
The percentage changes may seem small: mortality for 65 to 69 year olds increases by 
1.1 percent the week after Social Security checks arrived in 2005 and 2006, while mortality 
increased by 2.7 percent for those aged 18 to 64 the week the 2001 stimulus checks arrived.  
Relative to general movements in mortality, however, these results are substantial. 
Consider a simple analysis for 65 to 69 year olds in 2005 and 2006.  There are 471 
deaths per day among this group, so paycheck receipt increases mortality by 36.3 deaths per 
week.  In 2005 there were 5,532,900 people aged 65 to 69, so the death rate increased by 
7.86E-5 (36.3/5,532,900) the week after paycheck receipt.  To demonstrate the significance 
of this increase, we select a sample of 15,774 adults aged 65 to 69 using data from the 1987-
1990 National Health Interview Surveys Multiple Cause of Death (NHIS/MCOD) data file.
56  
We regress a dummy variable that equals one if a person died within 365 days of the initial 
interview on the natural log of family income, a dummy for gender, a set of race/ethnicity 
indicators, three indicators for education, six indictors for marital status, and a complete set 
of age and year-of-survey effects.  The coefficient (standard error) on log of family income in 
this regression is 0.00297 (0.00151).  Assuming that this represents a causal relationship, 
then these results suggest that in order to produce an decrease in the mortality rate by 7.86E-
5, incomes in this group would have to increase by 2.65 percent, which is roughly equal to 
the annual cost-of-living adjustments to Social Security payments over the past decade. 
Estimates for annual payments in Alaska produce a similar story.  In 2000, there was 
an average of 52.4 deaths per week among Alaskans aged over 18 years.  A 12 percent 
increase in mortality in one week would result in an extra 6.3 deaths for this group.  In the 
2001 American Community Survey, reported median household income was $67,090, and 
the average household had 2.77 members.  Each applicant received a $1,964 dividend in 
2000, which would have increased average family income by 9.7 percent.  Using similar data 
from the NHIS/MCOD, the coefficient (standard error) on the log of family income in a one-
year mortality regression is -0.00077 (0.00021).  Assuming again that this is represents the 
causal impact of income on one-year mortality, a 9.7 percent increase in income would 
mortality rates by 7.45E-5.  Multiplying this by the 418,815 adults in Alaska in 2000, this 
                                                            
56 This file provides mortality information for National Health Interview Survey respondents by matching 
surveys to the National Death Index.  A more detailed description of this data set and the sample can be found 
in Snyder and Evans (2006). 27 
 
increase in income is estimated to reduce deaths by 31.2.  Therefore, in this best case 
scenario of the impact of income on mortality, the short-term increase in mortality of 6.3 
deaths eliminates 20 percent of the estimated benefits from Permanent Fund income. 
These results have implications for research on the socioeconomic determinants of 
health.  As we noted in the introduction, the authors who have attempted to determine 
whether there is a causal impact of income on health have generated inconsistent results.  The 
short-term mortality impact of income receipt suggests two things about this literature.  First, 
authors must distinguish the time period of analysis because the short-term consequences 
may be very different from the long-term consequences.  Second, the short-term mortality 
effect of income receipt makes it more difficult to use exogenous variation in income to 
identify a causal link between income and health.  This increases the size of the sample or of 
the income shock required to find a statistically precise income/health relationship.   
The results outlined above also suggest a potential mechanism for the pro-cyclic 
nature of mortality that is outlined in Ruhm (2000).  The estimates in Ruhm and subsequent 
papers isolate a contemporaneous correlation between mortality and measures of the business 
cycle; yet to date, little has been offered to explain the pathways producing this result.  
However, if income rises over the business cycle, then the short-term mortality effects of 
income receipt may provide just such an explanation.  
There are potential policy consequences flowing from these results.  First, there is 
evidence of worse hospital patient outcomes when there are fewer medical professionals per 
patient (Kostis et al., 2007).  The heightened mortality associated with income receipt might 
suggest that emergency rooms, hospitals, police, and fire departments should adjust staffing 
levels in accordance with predictable high- and low-mortality days.  Our search of the 
Internet has so far not provided any anecdotal evidence that such adjustments already exist. 
Finally, we noted in the introduction that some health researchers have suggested that 
a way to reduce inequality in health outcomes across socioeconomic groups is to simply 
increase income transfers to low income groups.  The results in this paper indicate that the 
benefits of such a policy regime shift are far from certain.  There is little evidence to date that 
cash transfers increase health.  In contrast, the results in this paper show that, in the short run, 
there is a pronounced negative consequence to cash infusions for a wide variety of groups. 28 
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Days in Relation to Social Security Payment
Figure 1: 
Residuals From ln(Daily Mortality Count) Model, 
Controlling for Weekdays, Months and Years,
Decedents Aged 65 and Over, 1973 to 1996 MCOD Data
  Year
Cohort 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1947 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
1946 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
1945 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61
1944 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
1943 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1942 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
1941 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
1940 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
1939 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
1938 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
1937 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
1936 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
1935 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
1934 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
1933 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
1932 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
1931 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
1930 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
1929 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
 All enrollees entered SS under post-1997 rules
Enrollees could have entered SS under either pre or post 1997 Rules
All enrollees entered SS under pre-1997 rules





































Days in Relation to Payday
Figure 3:
Daily Mortality Counts in Military and Non-Military Counties,
Those Aged 17-64, 1973-1988  MCOD


























Weeks in Relation to Alaska Permanent Fund Payments
Figure 4:  
Average Residuals from ln(Weekly Mortality Counts) Model,
Controlling for Week and Year Effects 




 Table 1 
Estimates of Log of Daily Mortality Counts Equation 
In Relation to “3
rd of the Month” Social Security Payment Schedule and the  
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R
2 0.921  0.570  0.577  0.664 
Mean Daily Deaths  3,946  584  472  553 
Observations  8,766 8,766  730  731 
The reference periods are Week(-1) and Payweek(-1).  Week(3) and Payweek(3) are not 
complete seven-day weeks, as they represent the days outside the 28-day periods centered, 
respectively, on the first of the calendar month and each day Social Security is paid. The 
numbers in parentheses are standard errors that allow for an arbitrary correlation in the errors 
within a particular synthetic month/year group based on the Social Security payment 
schedule.  Other covariates in the model include a complete set of synthetic month and year 
effects based on the Social Security payment schedule, weekday effects, and a complete set 
of dummies for special days throughout the year described in footnote 16.  36 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of Log of Daily Mortality Counts Equation 
In Relation to the Post-1997 Social Security Payment Schedule and the 
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R
2 0.303  0.080  0.394  0.242 
Mean Daily Deaths  157  12.0  185  215 
Observations 2,190  2,190  2,193 2,190 
The reference periods are Week(-1) and Payweek(-1).  Week(3) and Payweek(3) are not 
complete seven-day weeks as they represent the days outside the 28-day periods centered, 
respectively, on the first of the month and days Social Security is paid.  Decedents are 






st of the 
month.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that allow for an arbitrary correlation 
in the errors within a particular synthetic month/year group based on the Social Security 
payment schedule.  Other covariates in the model include a complete set of synthetic month 
and year effects based on the Social Security payment schedule, weekday effects, a complete 
set of dummies for special days throughout the year described in footnote 16, and dummies 
for observations for decedents born in the first two periods in the month.   37 
 
Table 3 
Estimates of Log of Daily Mortality Counts Equation 
In Relation to “3
rd of the Month” Social Security Payments and the 1
st of the Calendar Month 














































           

















































           




































           
R
2  0.901  0.370  0.900  0.395 0.847 0.961 
Mean Daily Deaths  4,124  36  4,088  89  1,008  802 
Observations  6,575  6,575  6,575  8,766 8,766 8,766 
The reference periods are Week(-1) and Payweek(-1).  Week(3) and Payweek(3) are not 
complete seven-day weeks as they represent the days outside the 28-day periods centered, 
respectively, on the first of the month and days Social Security is paid.  Decedents are 






st of the 
month.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that allow for an arbitrary correlation 
in the errors within a particular synthetic month/year group based on the Social Security 
payment schedule.  Other covariates in the model include a complete set of synthetic month 
and year effects based on the Social Security payment schedule, weekday effects, a complete 
set of dummies for special days throughout the year described in footnote 16, and dummies 






Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Daily Mortality Negative Binomial Equation  
Counties With and Without a High Military Presence, Aged 17 to 64, 1973 to 1988 
  Payday near the 1
st of the Month  Payday near the 15
























(5) = (6) 






















































              































































There are 10,584 observations.  Military counties had over 15 percent of 17 to 64 year old 
residents who were active military personnel in the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses while 
non-military counties had less than one percent of the 17 to 64 year old residents in the 
military in 1970, 1980 and 1990.  Average daily deaths in military and non-military counties 
are 10.1 and 1235.7, respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors that allow for 
an arbitrary correlation across observations within a synthetic month/year group based on 
military payments.  Other covariates include a complete set of synthetic month and year 
effects, weekday effects, dummies for special days described in footnote 16, a dummy for 
observations from counties with a high military presence, an indicator for the first pay period, 




When 2001 Tax Rebates Were Distributed 
Last 2 digits of 
SS # 
Checks distributed 
during the week of    
Last 2 digits of SS 
# 
Checks distributed 
during the week of  
00-09  July 23    50-59  August 27 
10-19  July 30    60-69  September 3 
20-29  August 6    70-79  September 10 
30-39  August 13    80-89  September 17 




Estimates of Log of Weekly Mortality Counts Equation 
Aged 25 to 64 Years, 30-Week Period, Summer and Fall 2001 


































































            
P-value on Test, 
   Group Effects =0 
0.813 0.806  0.937  0.829  0.752  0.581 
            
R
2 0.715  0.723  0.157  0.724  0.183  0.256 
Mean Weekly Deaths 
    per Group 
1,014 1,014  85  929  993  993 
Observations 300  300  300  300  170  170 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Other covariates in the model include week fixed effects 
and Social Security number group fixed effects. 
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Table 7   

























2000 627,533  93%  $1,963.86 64%  10/4,W  10/5,Th  92.2% 
2001 632,241  93%  $1,850.28 66%  10/10,W  10/17,W  93.6% 
2002 640,544  92%  $1,540.76 70%  10/9,W  10/16,W  93.3% 
2003 647,747  92%  $1,107.56 72%  10/8,W  10/15,W  93.5% 
2004 656,834  91%    $919.84 72%  10/12,Tu  10/19,Tu  92.1% 
2005 663,253  90%  $845.76 73%  10/12,W  10/21,F  90.9% 
2006 670,053  88%  $1,106.96 76%  10/4,W  & 
10/19,Th 
11/14,Tu   97.8% 




Estimates of Log of Weekly Mortality Counts Equation 








Urban Areas,  
Without Substance Abuse 























  -0.0589 
(0.0803) 




 0.0921   
(0.0803) 
         
R
2  0.9996 0.9996 0.9994 0.9994  0.9993  0.9994 
Mean Weekly 
Deaths in Alaska 
59.8 59.8 32.6 32.6  30.0  30.0 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  There are 168 observations in each regression.  The 
average deaths per week in the rest of the United States is 45,866.  The average non-
substance abuse deaths per week in the rest of the United States is 44,606. Other covariates in 
the model include fixed week-year effects and a dummy for Alaska. 
 